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Lessons learnt from the cryptanalysis
of chaos-based ciphers∗
Gonzalo Alvarez1, Jose´ Mar´ıa Amigo´2, David Arroyo3, Shujun Li4
8.1 Introduction
The idea of using chaotic transformations in cryptography is explicit in the
foundational papers of Shannon on secrecy systems (e.g., [96]). Although the
word “chaos” was not minted till the 1970s [71], Shannon clearly refers to this
very concept when he proposes the construction of secure ciphers by means
of measure-preserving, mixing maps which depend ‘sensitively’ on their pa-
rameters. The implementation of Shannon’s intuitions had to wait till the
development of Chaos Theory in the 1980s. Indeed, it was around 1990 when
the first chaos-based ciphers were proposed (e.g., [78], [46]). Moreover, in 1990
chaos synchronization [91] entered the scene and shortly thereafter, the first
applications to secure communications followed [56, 37]. The idea is remark-
ably simple: mask the message with a chaotic signal and use synchronization
at the receiver to filter out the chaotic signal. The realization though had to
overcome the desynchronization induced by the message itself. After this ini-
tial stage, the number of proposals which exploited the properties of chaotic
maps for cryptographical purposes, grew in a spectacular way.
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As any topic developed in a rush tempo, chaos-based (or ‘chaotic’) cryp-
tography has suffered, and to a minor extent it is still suffering from annoying
shortcomings. Some of them even breach basic principles of cryptography but,
alas, persist in the publications after the many years and the many warnings
[6, 15, 17]. In this chapter we are going through the most common errors and
bad practices that have been marring chaos-based cryptography. Formulated
in a positive way, we shall highlight a number of principles and practices that
should be prior to any serious proposal in this field. These general principles
may be classified in four groups.
• Design aspects (e.g., specification of the key space, existence of weak keys,
etc.)
• Dynamic-theoretical aspects (e.g., use of maps with robust chaos, etc.)
• Computational aspects (e.g., computational efficiency, study of numerical
degradation, etc.)
• Security-related aspects (i.e., whether a cipher is resistant to known at-
tacks, etc.)
Needless to say, resistance of a new cipher against known attacks is no
guarantee of security, but it is obviously a necessary condition; the same ap-
plies to the various statistical tests for pseudo-randomness. The security of
each cipher has to be discussed on a case-by-case basis and it depends very
much on its specifics. Contrarily to the commonplace in chaotic cryptography
that the more “messy” the encryption process, the more secure the resulting
cipher, the security of a cipher should rely on general principles, well-tested
architectures and efficient implementations. This is the aim of this work, i.e.,
to emphasize the main problems of recent chaos-based cryptosystems in or-
der to establish a methodology to avoid them. Although it is not possible to
conclude the unconditional security of an encryption system, we can asses
its practical security by means of common tools and practices in the crypt-
analysis of chaotic cryptography. Furthermore, this analysis can be used to
define the requirements of chaotic cryptography from a theoretical point of
view. In particular, we shall advocate below for a chaos-based cryptography
on integer numbers or, more generally, finite fields as a general framework
where chaos-based cryptography can merge with conventional cryptography
while preserving its identity.
This paper is organized as follows. The first section deals with the main
problems of chaos-based cryptography, which are the conclusion of our work
in the field of the cryptanalysis of chaotic cryptosystems. As a result of the
study of those problems, in the second section we introduce a set of rules
to avoid them and to design secure chaotic cryptosystems (by means of the
critical contexts drawn through the discussion in the first section). The co-
herence between chaos-based cryptography and conventional cryptography
requires to go into a common theoretical background, which is the core of
the last two sections. Once the fundamental limitations of naive chaotic cryp-
tography have been recognized, one can take a practical approach and try
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to make the most of it. After all, the properties of the numerical (actually,
periodical) orbits of chaotic maps can be good enough in practice; as a matter
of fact, this has been the general approach till now. This being the case, the
last section concludes our paper by proposing the theoretical aspects of chaos-
based cryptography. In particular, we go into the question of how chaos-based
cryptography can be understood (and even defined) in the realm of finite-
precision (hence, discrete) mathematics. We want to stress right away that
a chaos-based (or rather ‘chaos-inspired’) cryptography on the integers, thus
without numerical degradation, is possible and, of course, preferable to the
use of real-number approximations. In fact, some examples of chaos-based ci-
phers on integer numbers are mentioned in Sec. 2 and 3 —this is the approach
we recommend.
8.2 Main problems in chaos-based cryptography
The number of chaos-based ciphers proposed in the literature is too large
for us to attempt here a review of them. The interested reader is referred to
[17] for a brief but sufficient overview. Rather than discussing this or that
implementation of chaos-based cryptography, we will only delve into the basic
ideas that unify all of them.
Roughly speaking, there are two classes of chaotic cryptosystems. The
first one is based on chaotic systems implemented in digital (i.e., discrete-
time and discrete-space) domain. This type of chaos-based ciphers are usually
known as digital chaos-based cryptosystems or digital chaotic ciphers. One
typical type of digital chaotic ciphers amounts to numerically computing a
great number of iterations of a discrete chaotic system, using the message
and/or the key as initial data (see [46, 43] and references therein). This is
basically also the strategy in [18], [102], where periodic approximations of
chaotic automorphisms are used to define substitutions (so-called S-boxes)
resistant to linear and differential cryptanalysis. The ciphers which exploit
the ergodicity of chaotic maps, like the one originally proposed in [31] and its
posterior improvements, may be thought in this class as well. There are also
some ciphers built on top of chaos-based pseudo-random number generators
(PRNGs) like those proposed in [70, 19].
The second class amounts to scrambling a message via a chaotic system
evolving in continuous-space (but maybe discrete-time) domain. Analog cryp-
tosystems based on chaos synchronization belong to this second class. Various
cryptosystems of this class, corresponding to distinct ways of hiding a mes-
sage, have drawn the attention of researchers over the years. The most impor-
tant schemes following such a principle are additive masking, chaotic switch-
ing, parameter modulation, and message-embedding (a.k.a. direct modula-
tion). Additive masking was first suggested in [56], [37] and [109]. Chaotic
switching is also referred to as chaos shift keying (CSK). A description with
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deep insights can be found in [61], even though the idea of CSK was proposed
a couple of years before [38]. Essentially, chaotic switching is a special type
of chaotic parameter modulation: binary modulation. As a generalization of
chaotic switching, the parameter involved in a parameter modulation system
can be both discrete [89, 38] or continuous [42, 51], rather than only 0 or 1 in
chaotic switching. The message-embedding technique is given different names
in the literature: embedding [72, 82], non autonomous modulation [112] or
direct chaotic modulation [47]. A slight different method based on message-
embedding is the hybrid message-embedding. It was first proposed in [113]
but the terminology “ hybrid” was actually introduced in [88]. Most analog
chaos-based cryptosystems are based on a single communication channel be-
tween the sender and the receiver, which is used to transmit the driving signal
and the encrypted message to achieve synchronization between the slave and
master systems. Some researchers also proposed to use two communication
channels to enhance security, where one channel is used for synchronization
and the other is for encryption [83, 54]. In Fig. 8.1, we show the basic struc-
tures of the three analog chaos-based cryptosystems: chaotic masking, chaotic
switching and chaotic modulation.
In any of the families of chaos-based cryptosystems the core of the design
process is the selection of a good chaotic system for an encryption algo-
rithm [55]. From a general point of view it is not possible to define chaotic
cryptosystems satisfying the chaotic-system-free property [64]. This being the
case, the selection of a certain encryption scheme demands the identification
of a group of chaotic systems with a certain set of dynamical properties.
Furthermore, the hardware implementation of the chaotic encryption algo-
rithm must guarantee its security, but also its efficiency. According to our
experience in the field of the cryptanalysis of chaos-based cryptosystems, the
most critical problems in chaotic cryptography arise from three elements: the
selection of a chaotic system, the choice of an encryption architecture, and
the implementation of the encryption. Next those problems are listed and
discussed, according to our previous works in [67, 24, 21].
8.2.1 Problems with the selection of the chaotic system
Problem 1. Definition of the key leading to non-chaotic behavior.
In some chaos-based cryptosystems the control parameters (or part of it)
of the underlying chaotic systems are determined by the secret key. If the
link between the secret key and the control parameters is not established
carefully, then it is possible that the underlying chaotic system evolves in an
non-chaotic way, which further erodes the confusion and diffusion properties
required by the resulting cryptosystem.
The chaotic systems used as base of cryptosystems are defined in a para-
metric way such that their dynamics depend on one or several control param-
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Fig. 8.1 Basic structures of the three analog cryptosystems based on chaos synchroniza-
tion.
eters. Moreover, those chaotic systems are dynamical systems which show
a chaotic behavior for certain values of the associated control parameters.
Therefore, the design of a cryptosystem based on any of those dynamical
systems must be done by guaranteeing the use of the set of values of the
control parameters leading to chaos. Otherwise, the underlying dynamical
system associated with the cryptosystem will not be chaotic anymore, which
implies a reduction of the level of entropy in the ciphertext (i.e., the output
of the cryptosystem) and also a decreasing of the influence on the ciphertext
of a change in the plaintext (i.e., the input of the cryptosystem). This prob-
lem is specially relevant when the design of the cryptosystem is based on a
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dynamical system with chaotic behavior only for a set of disjoint parts of the
whole space of the control parameters. This is the case of the logistic map
and the He´non map, which have been used in [93, 73, 106] and in [34] respec-
tively without a thorough analysis of their dynamics, as we have pinpointed
in [29, 27, 25, 26]. As a conclusion, it is highly advisable to use dynamical
systems with chaotic behavior for all the values of the control parameter(s).
That is, robust chaotic systems [30] should be used instead of non-robust
ones.
Problem 2. Nonuniform probability distribution function. In some
chaos-based encryption architectures the confusion and/or diffusion proper-
ties depend on the probability distribution function of the orbits derived from
the underlying chaotic systems. If that distribution is not uniform and de-
pendent on the values of control parameters, then the quality of the diffusion
process is reduced.
The iteration of a chaotic map can be used to generate pseudo-random
sequences to encrypt the plaintext. The encryption procedure could be per-
formed in different ways, but all of them demand the equiprobability of all the
states contained in the pseudo-random sequences. If this requirement is not
satisfied, then the conditional entropy of the ciphertext with respect to the
plaintext may not be large enough so that some information will be leaked
about relationships between the output and the input of the target cryptosys-
tem (see the entropy attack in [11], and the cryptanalysis in [10]). This effect
is specially significant for image encryption, as pointed out recently in [63].
As a remedy, chaotic maps with a uniform probability distribution function
should be selected as base of this kind of cryptosystems, being the family of
piecewise linear chaotic maps [68] a good option.
Problem 3. Return map reconstruction. The ciphertext of some cryp-
tosystems makes it possible to reconstruct a return map of the underlying
chaotic system. If such a return map is meaningful, then an attacker may be
able to infer the values of the control parameters that govern the evolution
of the chaotic system.
The most direct way to estimate the control parameters from a chaotic
orbit is to plot xn+1 versus xn, which is actually the chaotic map itself. If this
representation shows a simple function between xn+1 and xn, then it could
be possible to infer the control parameter. In [97] a chosen-ciphertext attack
is used to build a discretized version of the logistic map which further leads
to the estimation of the control parameter. One solution against this kind of
attack is to shuﬄe/truncate the chaotic orbit before using it for encryption,
which randomizes the plot of the return map.
The reconstruction of the return map is specially meaningful in the context
of analog chaos-based cryptography. Encryption techniques based on chaotic
masking or chaotic switching can be circumvented by constructing some re-
turn maps of the master system of an analog chaotic cryptosystem [92], as it
has been shown in [65, 66].
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Problem 4. Low sensitivity to secret key. The most common problem
(and one of the most serious ones) about analog chaos-based cryptosystems
is the low sensitivity to the secret key. The low sensitivity is a necessary
requirement for real implementations of any analog chaos-based cryptosystem
because it is impossible to ensure exact matching of the master and slave
systems. Unavoidable noise and manufactural component deviation involved
in chaotic circuits are the two main factors causing this security problem
[107, 116].
Problem 5. Erosion of computational efficiency due to the struc-
tural complexity of the underlying chaotic systems. The structural
complexity of a chaotic system is a critical element when evaluating its suit-
ability for cryptographic applications. With this bottom line in [21, Sec. 1.3.3]
we emphasized that structural complexity can be minimized by selecting
chaotic systems defined in discrete time. Indeed, in discrete time chaos can
be achieved for phase space of Dimension 1, whereas it has to be at least of
Dimension 3 when considering continuous time.
8.2.2 Problems with the encryption architecture
Problem 6. Part of the key should not leak the rest of the key.
In some cryptosystems the secret key is composed of different subkeys. If
the knowledge of some subkeys allows the recovery of the rest of the key,
then a partial key recovery attack can be performed. Therefore, the design
of a cryptosystem must guarantee that the different subkeys composing the
secret key are uncorrelated.
In the context of a secure and robust encryption system it is assumed that
partial knowledge of the key does not reveal information about the rest of the
key and, as a result, the cryptosystem performance is not harmed [6, Rule
7]. This rule is not satisfied in the scenarios drawn by [31, 34, 20], partial
knowledge of the key can be used to obtain the rest of the key [11, 26, 95].
Case study 8.2.1 ([26]) Cryptanalysis of the cryptosystem proposed in [34]
In [34] the He´non map is used as the heart of a chaos-based cryptosys-
tem, which entails a security problem that we have highlighted in [26]. The
analytical definition of the He´non map is:
xk+1 =
[
uk+1
vk+1
]
=
[
1− δ · u2k + vk
β · vk
]
, (8.1)
with δ, β ∈ R. In the cryptosystem defined in [34] the plaintext is divided into
blocks {pk}N−1k=0 , where each block has M bits. The encryption of the plain-
blocks is carried out for k = 0, . . . , N −1 in turn. For the k-th plain-block pk,
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the corresponding cipher-block is xk+1, which is calculated through Eq. (8.1)
by setting
δ = ψ (pk) · µ1 (vk) , (8.2)
β = µ2 (vk) , (8.3)
where ψ(x) is a bijective function assuring that δ is a valid parameter of
Eq. (8.1) and µi(x), i ∈ {1, 2}. Based on the general form of the proposed
cryptosystem, the authors of [34] present a concrete configuration: M = 48,
ψ(x), µ1(x) and µ2(x) are set in Eqs. (8.4), (8.5), (8.6) respectively.
ψ (x) = 1.77 · 10−2 + 1.39 · 10−15 · x, (8.4)
µ1(x) =

1.27 + x10.2 , if |x| ≤ 0.1 + x1.3
1.28 + x10.2 , if 0.1 +
x
1.3 < |x| ≤ 0.2 + x1.3
1.29 + x10.2 , if 0.2 +
x
1.3 < |x| ≤ 0.3 + x1.3
1.30 + x10.2 , otherwise
(8.5)
µ2(x) =

0.29 + x10 , if |x| ≤ 0.1 + x1.1
0.30 + x10 , if 0.1 +
x
1.1 < |x| ≤ 0.2 + x1.1
0.31 + x10 , if 0.2 +
x
1.1 < |x| ≤ 0.3 + x1.1
0.32 + x10 , otherwise
(8.6)
Next we show how a known-plaintext attack can be employed to recon-
struct Eq. (8.5), Eq. (8.6), and v0 (initial condition of the underlying He´non
map defined in Eq. (8.1)) when Eq. (8.4) is known. Given two plaintexts
{p1,k}N−1k=0 , {p2,k}N−1k=0 , then
u1,1 = 1− ψ(p1,0) · µ1(v0) · u20 + v0, (8.7)
u2,1 = 1− ψ(p2,0) · µ1(v0) · u20 + v0, (8.8)
and
u1,k+1 = 1− ψ(p1,k) · µ1(vk) · u21,k + vk, (8.9)
u2,k+1 = 1− ψ(p2,k) · µ1(vk) · u22,k + vk, (8.10)
vk = µ2(vk−1) · uk−1, (8.11)
where k ≥ 1. Subtracting Eq. (8.9) from Eq. (8.10):
µ˜1(vk) =
u2,k+1 − u1,k+1
ψ(p1,k) · u21,k − ψ(p2,k) · u22,k
. (8.12)
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From Eq. (8.11):
µ˜2(vk−1) =
u1,k+1 − 1 + ψ(p1,k) · µ˜1(vk) · u21,k
uk−1
. (8.13)
If the quantization error is ignored, we have µ˜1(vk) = µ1(vk) and µ˜2(vk−1) =
µ2(vk−1). As a consequence, it is possible to reconstruct µ1(vk) and µ2(vk)
repeating this procedure for k = 1, . . . , N . In order to prove the proposed
known-plaintext attack, 10000 points for µ1(vk) and µ2(vk) were calculated
for u0 = 0.4, v0 = 0.9402036 and u0 = 0.4, v0 = −0.5123493. In Fig. 8.2 it is
shown how it was possible to get an estimation of µ1(vk), µ2(vk) shape. This
is due to the fact that the first component of the He´non map employed in
the encryption process is sent through the communication channel without
applying any masking transformation.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1.27
1.28
1.29
1.3
1.31
1.32
1.33
y
µ 1
 
 
Real function
Guessed function
(a)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1.27
1.28
1.29
1.3
1.31
1.32
1.33
y
µ 1
 
 
Real function
Guessed function
(b)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.29
0.3
0.31
0.32
0.33
0.34
y
µ 2
 
 
Real function
Guessed function
(c)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.29
0.3
0.31
0.32
0.33
0.34
y
µ 2
 
 
Real function
Guessed function
(d)
Fig. 8.2 Recovered and original functions for the PRSK mechanism when they are de-
signed as in [34] (a) µ1(v) for v0 = 0.9402036; (b) µ1(v) and v0 = −0.5123493; (c) µ2(v)
for v0 = 0.9402036 ; and (d) µ2(v) and v0 = −0.5123493.
Problem 7. Key estimation from the ciphertext. A bad definition of
the ciphertext derived from a chaos-based cryptosystem could allow the es-
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timation of the initial condition(s) and/or the control parameter(s) of the
underlying chaotic system. This problem is present in some chaos-based cryp-
tosystems whose ciphertext is given by fragments of orbits, sampled versions
of the orbits, or discretized versions of the orbits of the underlying chaotic
systems. Moreover, parameter estimation is a critical problem of cryptosys-
tems based on chaotic parameter modulation, since adaptive synchronization
techniques can be used to get an approximation of the control parameters of
the underlying chaotic systems by minimizing the synchronization errors.
An m-dimensional discrete-time chaotic map is defined by the rule of evo-
lution
xn+1 = fλ(xn),
and, as a result, the ciphertext cannot be the orbits of the map since it may
allow the estimation of λ from m + 1 or a bit more consecutive units of
ciphertext. This is the case of the cryptosystem proposed in [73], and which
we have cryptanalyzed in [27].
Furthermore, if the invariant set of the chaotic map has a size dependent
on the control parameters, even sampled versions of the orbits may allow
the estimation of the control parameters through a ciphertext-only attack
[10]. We have analyzed this situation in [29] for the cryptosystem proposed
in [93]. In addition, the theory of symbolic dynamics may also reveal the
weakness of a cryptosystem if the ciphertext allows getting the symbolic
sequences of the underlying chaotic system. In [25] we have shown through a
chosen-ciphertext attack how to derive the symbolic sequence of the logistic
map driving the encryption procedure defined in [106]. Once we have the
symbolic sequence, we can infer the values of the control parameter and
initial condition of the underlying logistic map according to the theory of
applied symbolic dynamics described in [3]. Nevertheless, a constant size for
the invariant set of a chaotic map is a necessary but not sufficient condition to
avoid the estimation of the control parameter from the corresponding orbits.
In this respect, and according to [22], chaotic orbits should be analyzed also
by means of their associated order patterns. Finally, another critical context
is depicted when measures of statistical distance can be applied to distinguish
between keystreams, as we have shown in [23].
For most analog chaos-based secure communication systems, the cipher-
text is not very sensitive to the secret key, which is caused by a simple rela-
tionship between synchronization error and key mismatch: the larger the key
mismatch is, the larger the synchronization error will be, and vice versa. This
means that an iterative algorithm can be used to determine the value of the
secret parameters, which corresponds to the concept of adaptive synchroniza-
tion. A lot of work has been reported about adaptive synchronization when
the master systems’ parameters are unknown to the receiver/attacker. Some
of the work can directly be used or easily extended to break analog chaos-
based secure communication systems [39, 103, 104]. In addition to methods
based on adaptive synchronization, there are also other ways one can use to
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estimate the secret parameters (i.e., the key) of chaos-based cryptosystems.
For instance, due to the nature of Lorenz and Chua Chaotic Systems, the
secret parameters can be determined from the driving signal and its deriva-
tives (mainly differentials of different orders) [32, 105, 74]. For some specific
schemes, it is also possible to derive part of the secret parameters by ana-
lyzing the return maps of the master systems [65]. When chosen-ciphertext
attacks are possible, i.e., when the attacker can access the decryption machine
for some time, the attacker may set the driving signal to a fixed constant C
in order to get the values of all secret parameters [50].
Case study 8.2.2 ([27]) Cryptanalysis of the cryptosystem described in
[73]
In [73] the encryption procedure is carried out by decomposing the input
plaintext signal into two different subbands and masking each of them with a
pseudo-random number sequence generated by iterating the chaotic logistic
map. The decomposition of the input plaintext signal xn is driven by
tn = K
∑
∀j
xjh2n−j , (8.14)
t′n = K
′∑
∀j
xjh
′
2n−j . (8.15)
Then, the masking stage generates the ciphertext signal (vn, v
′
n) according
to the following equations:
vn = tn + α(t
′
n), (8.16)
v′n = t
′
n − α′(vn), (8.17)
where α(u) = u+ sn (α
′(u) = u+ s′n) and sn (s
′
n) is the state variable of the
logistic map.
The secret key of the cryptosystem is composed of the initial conditions
and the control parameters of the two logistic maps involved, i.e., s0, s
′
1, λ
and λ′.
In a known-plaintext attack the cryptanalyst possesses a plaintext signal
{xn} and its corresponding encrypted subband signals {vn} and {v′n}. Be-
cause {hn}, {h′n}, K and K ′ are public, we can get {tn} and {t′n} from {xn}.
Then we can get the values of {sn} and {s′n} as follows:
sn = vn − tn − t′n, (8.18)
s′n = t
′
n − vn − v′n. (8.19)
For n = 0, the values of the subkeys s0 and s
′
0 have been obtained. Fur-
thermore, we can obtain the control parameters by just doing the following
operations:
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λ =
sn+1
sn(1− sn) ,
λ′ =
s′n+1
s′n(1− s′n)
.
Problem 8. Direct extraction of plaintext. In the context of analog
chaos-based cryptography, in some cases it is feasible to infer the plaintext
message signals from the driving signals without estimating the secret key
or the carrier signals. Techniques such as power-spectral filtering (or power
energy analysis) and return map analysis have been used for this purpose.
Regarding power-spectral filtering, even when the power spectra of some
chaotic systems seem to be good, significant spectrum peaks can be found in
the spectra by removing the symmetries of the chaotic attractors [62, 86, 85].
For instance, the spectrum of x(t) in the Lorenz System is relatively good,
but that of |x(t)| has a significant peak. When the plaintext message signal
is hidden in the driving signal, the narrow-band spectrum means that the
driving signal may be directly filtered to recover the message signal [114, 8].
On the other hand, for some parameter modulation systems the power energy
of the driving signal varies according to the value of the transmitted signal.
This makes it possible to obtain a smoother version of the message signal by
observing the average power energy of the driving signal in a sliding time-
window [12]. Exact recovery of the plain message signal is possible for chaotic
switching systems, because each bit has to be held for a considerably long
time to ensure that chaos synchronization is established.
In addition to power filtering, cryptanalysts have figured out some other
techniques that can be used to extract the plaintext directly from the cipher-
text, which include generalized synchronization, short-time period analysis
and switching event detection. For chaotic switching systems and some pa-
rameter modulation systems, there is a simple relationship between the syn-
chronization error and the value of the transmitted signal. This link can be
interpreted as a way to extract the plaintext message signal directly [8, 115].
With respect to the study of short-time period, if the spectrum of the driving
signal (or some modification of it) involved has a significant peak, generally
there exists a simple relationship between the peak frequency and the values
of the control parameters. In this case, one can try to extract the short-time
period as a measurement of the peak frequency modulated by the plaintext
message signal. According to the change of the extracted short-time periods,
the plaintext message signal can be extracted exactly (for chaotic switching
systems) or approximately (for some parameter modulation systems) [111, 4].
Finally, for chaotic switching and parameter modulation systems the dynam-
ics of the master systems will change significantly when the value of the mod-
ulating signal (i.e., the plaintext message signal) changes. By detecting and
tracking these switching events, it may be possible to recover the modulating
signal [101].
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Case study 8.2.3 ([4]) Short-time period analysis based cryptanalysis of a
cryptosystem proposed in [40]
In [40], the author proposes a symmetric secure communication system
based on parameter modulation of a chaotic oscillator acting as a transmit-
ter. The receiver is a chaotic system synchronized by means of an adaptive
observer. Two sample implementations are given: one with the Lorenz at-
tractor and another with Chua’s attractor. In this case study the latter will
be broken, to illustrate how our method works with a different double-scroll
attractor. It works equally well for Lorenz attractor, though.
Chua’s circuit dynamics can be described by the following equations:
x˙1 = α(−x1 + x2)− f1(x1),
x˙2 = x1 − x2 + x3, (8.20)
x˙3 = −βx2.
where f1(x) = bx + 0.5(a − b)(|x + 1| − |x − 1|). In the example the
system is implemented with the following parameter values, (α, β, a, b) =
(10, 18,−4/3,−3/4). The encryption process is defined by modulating the
parameter β with the binary encoded plaintext, so that it is β + 1.25 if the
plaintext bit is “1” and β − 1.25 if the plaintext bit is “0”. The duration
of the plaintext bits must be much larger than the convergence time of the
adaption law. The uncertain system can be rewritten in a compact form as: x˙1x˙2
x˙3
 =
−10 10 01 −1 1
0 β 0
x1x2
x3
+
 f1(x1)0
0
+
00
1
x2θ, (8.21)
y = C · x = x3, (8.22)
C = [0 0 1], (8.23)
θ = ∆β = ±1.25. (8.24)
To launch an attack based on short-time period analysis, we first transform
x3(t) to |x3(t)|, which has a significant peak in the frequency domain and thus
a short-time periodicity linked to the plaintext bits. The short-time period
of |x3(t)| can be measured as the distance between adjacent cross-zero points
(or from the dominant frequency peak in the short-time FFT domain). The
resultant signal is denoted by p(t). Then, p(t) is filtered by removing singular
peaks and DC component to get p∗(t). Next, an averaging filter is used to get
a smoother signal fp∗(t). Finally, this smoother signal is binarized to recover
the plaintext signal. The signals involved in the process are shown in Fig. 8.3.
Problem 9. Efficiency of the cryptosystem depending on the value
of the key. If the encryption and decryption times depend on the key or a
subkey, then a timing attack can be performed to estimate the (sub)key.
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Fig. 8.3 Breaking a cryptosystem based on Chua’s circuit: a) original binary information
signal, i(t); b) the transmitted state variable signal or ciphertext, x3(t); c) the short-
time period signal, p(t); d) the clipped signal, p∗(t), after removing singular peaks and
DC component; e) the low-pass filtered signal, fp∗(t), revealing the modulation signal; f)
recovered message signal, i∗(t), after adequate detection.
Some encryption architectures perform the transformation of the plaintext
into the ciphertext through several encryption rounds. Additionally, in each
encryption round a chaotic map is iterated n times. Since the encryption and
decryption times have to be constant and independent of the value of the key,
it is not a good practice to select the number of encryption rounds and n as
part of the key. Otherwise, a timing attack [60, 33] based on the analysis of
the encryption and decryption time can be used for the partial estimation of
the secret key, which is a serious security flaw.
Case study 8.2.4 ([29]) Timing attack on a cryptosystem proposed in [93]
Let us exemplified a timing attack by recalling the cryptosystem proposed
in [93]. In every encryption round of the cryptosystem under consideration,
the logistic map is iterated n times, where n is a subkey. This means that, for
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a certain number of encryption rounds (j) and a certain value of the control
parameter λ, the encryption speed decreases as n increases. Similarly, because
the encryption/decryption procedure is composed of j repeated cycles, the
encryption speed will also become slower if the value of j increases. To be more
precise, for a given plain-image, we can expect the existence of the following
bi-linear relationship between the encryption/decryption time (EDT) and the
values of n and j:
EDT (n, j) ≈ (c× n+ d0)× j + d1, (8.25)
where c corresponds to the common operations consumed on each chaotic
iteration, d0 to the operations performed in each cycle excluding those about
chaotic iterations, and d1 to those operations performed on the initialization
process and the postprocessing after all the j cycles are completed. In addi-
tion, because λ is just the control parameter of the chaotic map, it is expected
that EDT will be independent of its value.
With the aim of verifying this hypothesis, some experiments have been
made under the following scenario. An image with random pixel values of size
256 × 256 was encrypted for different values of λ, n and j. The encryption
time corresponding to each key is shown in Fig. 8.4, from which one can see
that Eq. (8.25) is verified.
The above experimental results ensure the feasibility of a timing attack to
a subkey of the cryptosystem under study: by observing the encryption time,
it is possible to estimate the value of n if j is known and vice versa. Without
loss of generality, assuming an attacker Eve knows the value of n, but not that
of j, let us demonstrate how the timing attack can be performed in practice.
In this case, the relationship between EDT and the value of j can be simplified
as EDT (n, j) = cn× j + dn, where cn = c×n and dn = d0× j + d1. Then, if
Eve gets a temporary access to the encryption (or decryption) machine, she
can carry out a real timing attack in the following steps:
1. She observes the whole process of encryption (or decryption) to get the
encryption (or decryption) time tj and also the size of the ciphertext (i.e.,
the size of the plaintext).
2. By choosing two keys with different values of j, she encrypts2 a plaintext
(or decrypts a ciphertext) of the same size and gets t1 and t2.
3. She derives the values of cn and dn by substituting t1 and t2 into
EDT (n, j) = cn × j + dn.
4. She estimates the value of j to be jˆ = round((tj − dn)/cn).
5. She verifies the estimated value jˆ by using it to decrypt the observed
ciphertext. If the recovered plaintext is something meaningful, the attack
stops; otherwise, she turns to search the correct value of j in a small
neighborhood of jˆ until a meaningful plaintext is obtained.
2 Please note that this can be done on her own computer, as long as she has the encryp-
tion/decryption software installed.
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Fig. 8.4 Encryption time for images of size 256× 256 and different values of the number
of iterations n and the number of encryption rounds.
As a result of the previous analysis, the number of encryption rounds
and the number of iterations of the map should be public parameters of the
chaos-based cryptosystem instead of part of the key.
Problem 10. Faulty derivation of the parameters of the chaotic sys-
tem from the key. In some chaos-based cryptosystems the key is used to
derive the values of the parameters necessary to iterate a chaotic system and
finally encrypt the information. If this mapping implies a reduction of the
key space, i.e., that it is only used a subset of the possible values of those
parameters, then a brute-force attack on the values of the parameter could
be much less demanding than an attack on the secret key.
One important step in the design of a chaos-based cryptosystem is to
decide what the key is. One possibility is to use the control parameters and
the initial conditions of the underlying chaotic systems as the secret key or as
part of the secret key. Another option is to establish the values of the control
parameters and the initial conditions of the maps from the secret key through
a certain function. In this sense, it must be assured that the image set of that
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function is the whole set of possible values of the control parameters and the
initial conditions. Otherwise, a brute-force attack can be performed on the
reduced space of control parameters and initial condition values with a lower
computational cost than the one on the key space. A cryptosystem with this
problem was introduced in [87] and was later cryptanalyzed in [9].
Problem 11. Encryption procedure equivalent to a map dependent
only on the key. If the transformation of the plaintext into the ciphertext
is determined by a procedure equivalent to a map only dependent on the key,
then known/chosen-plaintext attacks may be performed to reconstruct the
transformation procedure.
In some encryption schemes the transformation of the plaintext into the
ciphertext is led either by a procedure derived using only the key, or by
a sampling process on a sequence of values generated using only the key.
In those situations, it could be possible to estimate either the key or to
make up some function somehow equivalent to the encryption procedure.
For example, if the encryption procedure consists of searching plaintexts in
pseudo-random sequences generated by iterating a chaotic map, since the
pseudo-random sequence remains unchanged unless the key is modified, then
it is possible to reconstruct the pseudo-random sequence through a chosen-
plaintext attack (see [14, 13]). This problem also exists in those schemes where
the encryption procedure consists of a permutation-only stage which is fixed
unless the control parameters and initial conditions change, i.e., unless the
the secret key is updated. In order to clarify this matter, let us consider again
the cryptosystem defined in [44].
Case study 8.2.5 ([28]) Cryptanalysis of the cryptosystem defined in [44]
As mentioned above, the cryptosystem under consideration consists of two
stages: a shuﬄing stage and a masking stage. Assuming that the size of the
plain-image I is M × N and the cipher-image is I′, the encryption scheme
proposed in [44] can be described by the following two procedures.
• Shuﬄing procedure
In this procedure, the plain-image I is permuted to form an intermediate
image I∗ according to a total shuﬄing matrix P∗, which is derived by
pseudo-randomly permuting the rows and columns of the original position
matrix P = [(i, j)]. The pseudo-random row and column permutations are
generated by iterating the logistic map with λ = 4 from a given initial
condition x0.
• Masking procedure
In this procedure, the intermediate image I∗ is further masked by a
keystream {B(i)}MNi=1 as follows: ∀i = 1 ∼ MN , I ′(i) = I∗(i) ⊕ B(i) ⊕
I ′(i−1), where I(i), I ′(i) denote the i-th pixels of I∗ and I′ (counted from
left to right and from top to bottom), respectively, and I ′(0) = 128.
18 Gonzalo Alvarez1, Jose´ Mar´ıa Amigo´2, David Arroyo3, Shujun Li4
The keystream {B(i)}MNi=1 is generated by iterating Lorenz [75] and Chen
[35] Systems and doing some postprocessing on all the variables of state.
When a variation of stream cipher is created, as in the case under study, ob-
taining the keystream is totally equivalent to obtaining the key whenever dif-
ferent plain-images are encrypted using the same key. Upon this hint, in [28]
we have carried out a chosen-plaintext attack to recover both the keystream
and the shuﬄing matrix of the cryptosystem described in [44]. Let us choose
a plain-image I1 such that ∀i, j = 1 ∼ MN , I1(i) = I1(j) = θ. In this case,
the shuﬄing part does not work, so we have I∗1 = I1. Then, we can recover
the keystream as follows: ∀i = 1 ∼ MN , B(i) = I1(i) ⊕ I ′1(i) ⊕ I ′1(i − 1).
After removing the masking part, we can try to recover the shuﬄing matrix.
According to the general cryptanalysis on permutation-only ciphers in [69],
only dlog256(MN)e chosen plain-images are needed to recover the shuﬄing
matrix P∗. In total we need dlog256(MN)e+1 chosen plain-images to perform
this chosen-plaintext attack.
As a conclusion, the encryption function that transforms a unit of plaintext
into a unit of ciphertext should depend on the key and on the whole plaintext.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 8.5 Illustration of the low sensitivity to the change of the plain-image: (a) the first
plain-image I0; (b) the second plain-image I1 (only the center pixel is different from I0);
(c) the differential cipher-image I′0 ⊕ I′1.
Problem 12. Low sensitivity to the change of plaintext. In some en-
cryption architectures plaintexts with slightest differences are associated to
very similar ciphertexts, which is a clear violation of the diffusion property.
This problem is specially relevant when considering the encryption of im-
ages. This being the case, the encryption scheme must guarantee that two im-
ages differing in just one pixel determine two totally different cipher-images.
This requirement is not satisfied if encryption is performed through just one
encryption round, as it occurs with the cryptosystem proposed in [44] (Case
study 8.2.5). For that cryptosystem, given two plain-images I0 and I1 with
only one pixel difference at the position (i, j), the difference will be permuted
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to a new position (i∗, j∗) according to the shuﬄing matrix P∗. Then, be-
cause all plain-pixels before (i∗, j∗) are identical for the two plain-images,
the ciphertexts will also be identical. This shows the low sensitivity of the
image encryption scheme to changes in the plain-image. Figure 8.5 gives an
example of this problem. It can be seen how the differential cipher-image is
equal to zero for any pixel before (i∗, j∗) and equal to a constant value after
that position.
8.2.3 Implementation problems
Problem 13. Degradation of the efficiency of digital chaos-based
cryptosystems based on chaotic systems. In digital chaos-based cryp-
tography the encryption procedure is performed in discrete time and discrete
space. Therefore, if the underlying chaotic system is defined in continuous
domain, then it is necessary to apply some numerical methods to obtain the
chaotic orbits. The application of these numerical methods increases the time
to compute the orbits, and thus reduces the encryption efficiency.
The rule of evolution of continuous-time chaotic systems requires to solve a
system of differential equations [49, p. 160]. From a general point of view, the
solution of those differential equations cannot be accomplished analytically,
and thus numerical methods must be applied. Numerical methods for the
resolution of differential equations are highly time consuming. As a result,
for a given encryption architecture with the underlying chaotic system defined
in continuous-time, the encryption time is greater than the encryption time
obtained when the chosen dynamical system is a chaotic map.
Case study 8.2.6 ([28]) Evaluation of the encryption time of the chaos-
based cryptosystem proposed in [44].
For the sake of argument, let us recall our cryptanalytic work [28] on the
chaos-based cryptosystem proposed in [44]. This cryptosystem is intended to
encrypt images through the concatenation of a shuﬄing and masking proce-
dures. The shuﬄing procedure is based on the iteration of the logistic map,
whereas masking is built upon the iteration of two continuous-time chaotic
systems: Lorenz [75] and Chen Systems [35]. The Lorenz System is given by
dx1
dt
= αx1 + αx2,
dx2
dt
= −x1x3 + βx1 − x2,
dx3
dt
= x1x2 − ρx3, (8.26)
where α, β, and ρ are control parameters. The Lorenz system is chaotic for
a set of parameters α = 10, β = 28, and ρ = 8/3. On the other hand, the
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Chen System is defined as
dx1
dt
= η(x2 − x1),
dx2
dt
= (σ − η)x1 − x1x3 + σx2,
dx3
dt
= x1x2 − δx3, (8.27)
being chaotic for a different set of parameters such as η = 35, σ = 28,
and δ = 3. Because the chaotic iterations of Lorenz and Chen Systems in-
volve complicated numerical differential functions, the encryption speed is
expected to be very slow compared with other traditional ciphers. To asses
this fact, we derived a modified encryption scheme from the original one by
replacing Lorenz and Chen Systems with the logistic map, and then com-
pared the encryption speeds of the two cryptosystems. Both cryptosystems
were implemented using MATLAB on a PC with a 1.6 GHz processor and
512 MB of RAM. For images of size 256 × 256, the typical encryption time
for the original cryptosystem in [44] was around 5.8 s, while the modified
cryptosystem based on the logistic map required on average around 1.2 s to
encrypt an image. The experiments have clearly shown that using continu-
ous chaotic systems can drastically reduce the encryption speed. Since there
are also no other obvious merits in using continuous chaotic systems rather
than a simple discrete-time chaotic map, the use of Lorenz and Chen Systems
in the image encryption scheme under study is unnecessary. Instead, these
continuous-time chaotic systems can be replaced by a simpler discrete-time
chaotic map without compromising the security. This statement is a general
rule when designing encryption procedures working in discrete time.
Problem 14. Non-invertible encryption procedure. The iteration of
the chaotic systems sustaining chaos-based cryptosystems implies working
with real numbers. Since the implementation of chaos-based cryptosystems
is done with finite precision arithmetic, round-off operations could lead to a
non-invertible encryption procedure.
One critical point when working with dynamical systems and the analysis
of their dynamics is the selection of a proper simulation framework. Indeed,
the computer-based analysis of dynamical systems could lead to some con-
clusions different from those expected from theory. This divergence also in-
fluences and conditions chaos-based cryptosystems, as pointed out in [76] for
the case of CSK. Thus, if the characteristics and problems of finite-precision
are not handled properly, then it is possible that the orbits generated as base
of the encryption procedure can not be regenerated exactly during the de-
cryption stage and, consequently, the original plaintext can not be recovered
even when the key is known. This problem is not only relevant for fixed-point
arithmetic but also for floating-point one. Indeed, the round-off quantization
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errors could lead to the occurrence of a non-invertible function for encryption
and, as a result, the decryption process will be impossible.
Case study 8.2.7 ([29, 26, 7]) Non-invertible cryptosystems defined in [93,
34, 94].
The cryptosystems introduced in [93, 34, 94] are examples of the conse-
quences of not handling conveniently the limitations of finite precision arith-
metics, as we have pinpointed in [29, 26, 7]. To clarify the problem under
consideration, let us recall the scope depicted in [93], whose goal is to encrypt
images. The cryptosystem described in [93] generates a ciphertext consisting
of a number of real values. Encryption is performed through j encryption
rounds, being {xic(r)}Ji=1 (c = R, G and B, r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , j − 1}) the output
in the r-th encryption round corresponding to color component c of the i-th
pixel of the image of length J = M × N . All the operations to encrypt an
image in [93] are performed using floating-point arithmetic. The output of the
r-th round is given as xic(r) = xn + x
i
c(r− 1), where xn is the resulting value
of iterating the logistic map n times from x0. Hence, if during the decryption
process we want to recover xic(r − 1) (the original value of the i-th element
in the last round), we have to iterate n times the logistic map from x0 to get
xn and, after that, to substract this value from x
i
c(r). However, the resulting
value of this previous operation might not match the actual value of xic(r−1),
due to the wobbling precision problem that exists when dealing with floating-
point operations [48, p. 39]. This wobbling precision problem also causes the
resulting guessed value of xic(r−1) to depend on the cryptosystem implemen-
tation. Therefore, if an image is encrypted on one platform and decrypted on
another, and the implementations of floating-point arithmetics on both plat-
forms are not compatible with each other, then the decrypted image might
not match the original one. In [93] the cryptosystem was implemented us-
ing Microsoft Visual C# .NET 2005 and no comment was given about the
wobbling precision problem in the decryption process. However, we have ex-
perimentally verified that this problem indeed exists when the cryptosystem
is implemented using MATLAB on a PC with a 3 GHz processor and 2 GB
RAM. A very useful measure of the performance of the decryption procedure
is the Mean Square Error or MSE. For P and P ′ being a plain image and the
decrypted image respectively, the MSE for the color component c is defined
as
MSEc =
m∑
i=1
(P ic − P ′ic)2/J, (8.28)
where c ∈ {R,G,B}, J = M × N is the number of pixels of the images
considered and the sequences
{
P ic
}J
i=1
and {P ′c}Ji=1 are the result of scan-
ning P and P ′ in the raster order. Consequently, for a well designed en-
cryption/decryption scheme the MSE should be 0 for each color compo-
nent. Unfortunately, for the cryptosystem under study, the values of MSE
for all three color components are generally not equal to 0 due to the wob-
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bling precision problem associated to the floating-point arithmetic. In order
to evaluate the underlying decryption error of the cryptosystem defined in
[93], a 512× 512 plain-image “Lena” was encrypted and decrypted using the
same key (n, j, λ) = (30, 1, 3.9). The results showed that the three MSEs
obtained for the red, green and blue components of the decrypted image
with respect to the original one were 6.49, 0.018, 0.057, respectively. For
another key (n, j, λ) = (30, 3, 3.9), the obtained MSEs were 206.96, 123.45,
58.65, respectively. Figure 8.6 shows the decrypted image and the error im-
age when the cryptosystem was implemented in MATLAB using a third key
(n, j, λ) = (5, 2, 3.9).
Fig. 8.6 Simulations with MATLAB (a) Ciphertext of the plain-image “Lena” (b) Re-
covered image of “Lena” using the same key (c) The error image between the original and
the recovered “Lena”.
Problem 15. Dynamical degradation. The implementation of chaotic
systems in finite precision in digital computers leads often to dynamical prop-
erties completely different from the theoretical and expected ones. If this de-
viation is not considered during the design of chaos-based cryptosystems, it
could imply a reduction of the performance and even a compromise of the
security of the resulting cryptosystem.
This problem is closely related to the previous one, although the point of
interest moves to degradation of dynamical properties of the implemented
chaotic system with respect to the theoretical model. Consequently, the de-
sign of an encryption scheme using a chaotic system must be done by con-
sidering its practical implementation (not only the theoretical model). In [5]
some consequences of the dynamical degradation of a chaotic map are shown
in the context of cryptography, whereas in [68] one can find a thorough anal-
ysis of the dynamical degradation of a specific chaotic map and some ways
to overcome this problem.
Problem 16. Lack of details in the description. According to Kerck-
hoffs’ principle [80, p. 14], the security of a cryptosystem can not be based
on the secrecy of its encryption and decryption procedures. In other words,
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when dealing with the security of cryptosystems, everything is known except
the key. Furthermore, the key of any cryptosystem has to be easy to establish
and to exchange, and the key space must be defined in an explicit and clear
way.
The consecution of security through obscurity is something to avoid when
designing an encryption scheme. All the operations involved in the encryp-
tion/decryption procedures must be unmistakably explained, and the secret
key must be clearly specified along with an exact estimation of the size of
the key space. The security of the cryptosystem must be only related to the
difficulty of recovering the key, and it can not depend on the lack of knowl-
edge about the inner operation of the encryption and decryption procedures.
Moreover, this lack of details implies a lack of security because without a
careful investigation by the cryptography community, many security holes
might not be able to be distinguished by the designers themselves.
Case study 8.2.8 ([26, 28]) Non-exhaustive definition of the encryption
and decryption scheme implying loss of chaoticity or randomness of keystreams
[34, 44].
In [21, Sec. 2.2] we have analyzed the loss of chaoticity in the cryptosystem
defined in [34]. Indeed, in that cryptosystem part of the key is given by a set of
functions changing the values of the control parameters of a He´non map as the
plaintext is encrypted. The authors of [34] do not define explicitly and rigor-
ously those functions, which could result in a security flaw, as we have shown
in [26] for the set of functions given by Eqs. (8.4)-(8.6). Another example of
the kind of problem under consideration can be found in some encryption
schemes built upon continuous-time chaotic systems. Certainly, when work-
ing with this type of chaotic systems it is necessary to use numerical methods
to compute the chaotic orbits. The decryption procedure requires to gener-
ate the same chaotic orbits as in the encryption stage and, consequently, its
computation must be done using the same numerical method and the same
time step. Moreover, the influence of both the numerical method and the time
step on the performance of the cryptosystem must be thoroughly evaluated.
Let us take up again the cryptosystem defined in [44]. The masking stage of
that cryptosystem is driven by a keystream derived from the orbits of Lorenz
and Chen Systems. In [44], the authors did not say anything about the time
step τ of iterating the Lorenz and Chen systems. However, the randomness
of the keystream is tightly dependent on the value of the time step. As an
extreme example, if τ = 10−20, we will get a keystream of identical elements
(according to the algorithm described in Sec. 2.3 of [44]).
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8.3 Design rules for chaos-based cryptography
According to the above problems, we proceed with the concretion and sys-
tematization of the guidelines to observe when designing a chaos-based digital
cryptosystem. These guidelines, that can be interpreted as the extension of
the set of rules provided in [6].
Rule 1 Exhaustive and rigorous definition of the chaotic encryp-
tion and decryption algorithms.
The design of any encryption system must be guided by Kerckhoffs’ princi-
ples, and thus the consecution of security through obscurity must be totally
discarded. The designed cryptosystem must be easily reproducible, in order
to make its implementation, use and further analysis easy. Indeed, guaran-
teeing the security of an encryption procedure is a quite complex and elusive
problem, so the more people participate in the analysis, the more complete
the security assessment will be. Regarding specifically chaos-based cryptosys-
tems, the design rule here referred implies that:
a) The encryption/decryption algorithms must assure control parameters de-
termining the chaotic behavior of the selected maps.
b) The final cryptosystems must be evaluated by means of the classical crypt-
analytic framework [21, Sec. 1.2.2].
c) It must be confirmed that an attacker cannot get enough information
about the underlying chaotic orbits, and thus she cannot carry out an
estimation of control parameters and/or initial condition.
Rule 2 Exhaustive and rigorous definition of the key and the key
space.
In chaos-based cryptography it is mandatory to specify clearly and carefully
the relationship between the secret key and the parameters determining the
temporal evolution of the underlying chaotic maps, i.e., the control parame-
ters and the initial conditions. In some cryptosystems either the control pa-
rameters or the initial conditions or both are part of the secret key, whereas
in others they are just design parameters and, consequently, publicly known.
Another possibility is that the secret key determines the values of the con-
trol parameter(s) and initial condition(s). In all situations it must be verified
that the underlying dynamical systems involved in the considered chaos-based
cryptosystem evolve as required, i.e., in a chaotic way. In other words, the
values of the control parameters used during encryption and decryption must
determine a positive value of the largest component of the Lyapunov Expo-
nent (LE). In this respect, this rule is related to the diffusion property, since
it is intended to make the relationship between the key (or the plaintext)
and the ciphertext as complex as possible. The goal is to erase any possible
pattern or redundancy in the ciphertext, and thus to avoid inference of the
secret key from the ciphertext. In the context of chaos-based cryptography,
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diffusion is connected to the local rate of divergence of orbits. As a result,
chaotic maps with high values of LE must be selected. It is also possible to
use chaotic maps with small LE if the encryption of each unit of plaintext is
performed iterating several times the chaotic map. Nevertheless, it implies a
reduction of the efficiency of the cryptosystem, and thus it is preferable to
discretize the key space to guarantee the avalanche effect, i.e., the result of
encrypting a plaintext with two slightly different keys must produce totally
different ciphertexts. The tools for verification of the avalanche effect are the
same used in the assessment of parameter mismatch (next rule), i.e., the sta-
tistical distance and the MRE (MultiResolution Entropy) . The discretization
of the key space implies a reduction of its size, which could result in a degra-
dation of the protection against brute-force attacks. A possible solution to
this problem is to discretise the orbits of the chaotic maps instead of the key
space. As we have shown in [21, Sec. 2.2] for the skew tent map, this strategy
determines an increasing of the LE and, consequently, of diffusion.
On the other hand, the determination of LE entails some inaccuracies [90]
and, consequently, it is highly advisable to analyze the chaoticity of orbits
using auxiliary tools as the entropy measures referred in [21, Secs. 2.4 and
2.5]. Finally, either LE or the different entropy measures can bring to light a
somehow one-to-one relationship between the rate of divergence of orbits and
the control parameter(s). In this case, if a chaos-based cryptosystem allows
an estimation of the rate of divergence, then it could be possible to estimate
the control parameter(s), which represents a vulnerability of the cryptosytem
being the control parameter(s) part or determined by the secret key.
Rule 3 Selection of chaotic maps with high sensitivity to control
parameter mismatch.
The size of the key space of any cryptosystem must be large enough to
avoid the feasibility of a brute-force attack. This is a common requirement
of all encryption systems, and it has to be fulfilled in accordance with the
computational capacity of any possible attacker. As it is pointed out in [6,
Rule 15], today’s computer speed requires a key space of size larger than
2100. As indicated by the previous rule, in digital chaos-based cryptography
the specification of the key space is mainly guided by the calculation of the
LE. Consequently, the resolution in the computation of the LE is a measure
of the maximum number of possible keys, and thus an approximation of the
size of the key space. To get a number of keys larger than 2100 ≈ 1030, the
resolution must be 10−30. However, with that resolution, thousands of keys
would become equivalent, unless there is a strong sensitivity to parameter
mismatch. It implies that the concretion of the key space must be accompa-
nied of an exhaustive analysis of the orbits generated for each value of the
control parameters. Indeed, it must be tested that the orbits are different
enough to assure that the encryption procedure possesses confusion and dif-
fusion properties. Useful tools in this regard are the statistical distance [21,
Sec. 2.6] and the MRE [21, Sec 2.5.2].
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Rule 4 The selected chaotic map should not allow total character-
ization of its dynamics from partial knowledge of this dynamics.
The total characterization of the dynamics of a chaotic map requires the
knowledge of the initial condition and the control parameter(s). When con-
sidering a chaos-based cryptosystem, it could be possible for an attacker to
guess either the initial condition or control parameter(s). Upon the guessed
information, the attacker could use some of the general attack strategies [21,
Sec. 1.2.2] to get some additional information about the orbits of the under-
lying chaotic map. For some chaotic maps, this additional information and
the guessed information drive to the estimation of the rest of parameter(s)
describing the dynamics of the map. For example, if the chaotic map selected
for an encryption architecture is a unimodal map, and the encryption ar-
chitecture allows to infer the symbolic sequences of the map through some
attack, then the knowledge of the control parameter allows to recover the
initial condition.
Rule 5 Analysis of the performance of chaotic orbits as source of
entropy.
From the point of view of cryptography, the appealing of chaos is mainly
motivated by its random-like behavior. Actually, “the battle” of any cryp-
tographer is to look for sources of uncertainty that can be further used to
conceal the information. The design of a cryptosystem is the specification
of a series of transformation procedures based on sources of indetermination
and applied on the source of information. In chaos-based cryptography, all
or some of the transformation procedures use chaos as source of indetermi-
nation. Since the security of the whole cryptosystem lies on the efficiency of
each transformation procedure, the entropy must be evaluated. Again, the
assessment can be done upon tools as those described in [21, Secs. 2.6 and
2.5.2]. Furthermore, this assessment can also be refined by considering every
transformation procedure as a Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG).
Upon this consideration, evaluation can be fulfilled using the battery of sta-
tistical tests of the National Institute of Standard & Technology (NIST) [84].
Nevertheless, if chaos is used as base of a stream cipher, then it is also nec-
essary to analyze the possibility of reconstructing the symbolic dynamics in
order to verify the feasibility of estimation for the control parameter(s) and
initial condition(s) as it is done in [21, Chapters 3 and 4].
Rule 6 Chaotic maps with uniform invariant density functions and
measure of the invariant set independent of the control parameters
should be used.
If this requirement is satisfied, then the chaotic cryptosystem possesses the
confusion property. If the underlying dynamical system evolves, as expected,
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chaotically, then it possesses the ergodic property and thus orbits are statis-
tically independent of the control parameter(s) and initial condition(s). As a
result, the ciphertext should be statistically undistinguishable from the out-
put of a truly random function, and should be statistically the same for all
the keys.
Rule 7 The ciphertext space must be defined in such a way that the
reconstruction of the dynamics of the underlying chaotic maps is
not possible.
Ciphertexts of chaos-based cryptosystems must not leak information about
the symbolic dynamics, the return map or any other shortcut to reconstruct
the dynamics of the underlying chaotic maps.
Rule 8 The encryption/decryption time must not depend on the
value of the secret key of a chaos-based cryptosystem.
If it is necessary to perform encryption through several rounds and several
iterations of the underlying chaotic maps, then the number of encryption
rounds and the number of iterations must be publicly known. They can not
be considered as part of the secret key, since a mere analysis of the encryp-
tion/decryption time allows an estimation of those values.
Rule 9 Resistance to classical attacks.
The cryptanalysis of chaos-based cryptosystems combined techniques from
the theory of dynamical systems and from the cryptanalysis of conventional
cryptography. In this concern, it must be verified the robustness of the cryp-
tosystem against known-plaintext, chosen-plaintext, known-ciphertext (or
ciphertext-only), and chosen-ciphertext attacks [100, p. 95]. Specialized at-
tacks must also be evaluated [99]. For digital chaos-based block ciphers resis-
tance to differential [102] and linear cryptanalysis [53] must be proved.
Rule 10 Resistance to application-specific attacks.
The encryption of information with special features must be defined carefully
in order to avoid the leaking of such features in the ciphertext. This is the case
of digital images and videos. In digital images (videos) there exists strong
correlation between different pixels (transform coefficients), which can be
used to develop some effective correlation-based attacks.
8.4 Chaos-based cryptography: a conclusion but not the
end of the road
Recalling the main conclusions of our works in the field of cryptanalysis, a
theoretical framework is next proposed in order to fulfill the set of rules pre-
viously explained. This theoretical basis is conceived as a manner to achieve
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at least the same level of security and efficiency of conventional cryptogra-
phy, but using the theory of chaotic dynamical systems as core instead of the
theory of numbers.
Nowadays, the information (whether analog or digital) is processed by
computers. This means that however chaos enters the encryption (key-stream
generation, masking, etc.), the finite precision of the computer (or any other
finite-state machine for this matter) will degrade chaotic orbits to periodic
orbits — occasionally of a very long period. Although this may be acceptable
from a practical point of view, it is not from a theoretical one. Put in other
words, the concept and virtues of chaos are not exportable without change
to the realm of discrete and finite mathematics.
If there is no chaos in a finite-state space, what is then a “chaotic” cipher?
To answer this question in a satisfactory way, one has to go away from the
real numbers (there are no real numbers in the real world) and use algorithms
on integer numbers or finite fields, while preserving the spirit of chaos-based
cryptography. A paradigmatic example was given by Pichler and Scharinger,
and reproduced in [43], where several chaotic maps were discretized and used
for image encryption. Let us remember it at this point.
Let I2 = [0, 1] × [0, 1] ⊂ R2 endowed with the Lebesgue measure, and let
B : I2 → I2 be the baker map,
B(x, y) =
{
(2x, 12y), 0 ≤ x < 12 ,
(2x− 1, 12y + 12 ), 12 ≤ x ≤ 1.
The baker map is a chaotic bijection of the unit square I2 onto itself. This
map stretches the left rectangle [0, 1/2)×[0, 1) horizontally onto the “bottom”
rectangle [0, 1)× [0, 1/2), while the right rectangle [1/2, 1)× [0, 1) is similarly
mapped onto the “top” rectangle [0, 1)× [1/2, 1).
Pichler and Scharinger generalized this map in the following way [43]. The
unit square I2 is now divided into k vertical rectangles [Fi−1, Fi) × [0, 1),
i = 1, ..., k, Fi = p1 + ...+ pi, F0 = 0, with p1 + ...+ pk = 1. The generalized
baker map stretches each rectangle horizontally by the factor of 1/pi, while it
is contracted vertically by the factor of pi. Finally, all transformed rectangles
are stacked on top of each other. Formally,
B(x, y) =
(
1
pi
(x− Fi), piy + Fi
)
for
(x, y) ∈ [Fi, Fi + pi)× [0, 1).
If we denote this map by B(p1,...,pk), then the standard baker map corresponds
to B(1/2,1/2). The generalized baker map inherits all important properties of
the baker map such as sensitivity to initial conditions and parameters, mixing
and bijectiveness.
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One possibility of discretizing B(p1,...,pk) on an integer lattice is the fol-
lowing. Let N be an integer, and let n1, ..., nk be integers such that each ni
divides N , and n1 + ... + nk = N . Denoting Ni = n1 + ... + ni, the lattice
point (r, s), with Ni−1 ≤ r < Ni, N0 = 0, and 0 ≤ s < N , is mapped by the
discretized generalized baker map B(n1,...,nk) to
3
B(n1,...,nk)(r, s) =
(
N
ni
(r −Ni) + smodN
ni
,
ni
N
(
s− smodN
ni
)
+Ni
)
.
Coming back to the question, what a chaotic cipher on a finite-state space
should be, the answer (intentionally vague) proposed in [15] and repeated in
the next section, was inspired by this and similar examples. Other technique,
studied in [59] in the framework of discrete chaos, furnish permutations by
truncation of chaotic orbits. Since the discretized map, whatever the dis-
cretization method used, is desired to somehow inherit the properties of the
continuous chaotic map, the former should become increasingly close to the
latter in the ‘continuous’ limit. In the case of the discretized baker map, the
continuous limit refers to an ever finer coarse-graining of the unit square. In
the framework of discrete chaos, the continuous limit refers to ever longer
orbits segments, and the closeness refers to the convergence of the discrete
LE(s) of the permutation to the LE(s) of the chaotic map.
8.4.1 Chaos-based cryptography on integer numbers
and finite fields
The idea underlying the above construction of the discretized generalized
baker map (namely, to define a permutation via discretization of a chaotic
map) provides an approach to chaos-based cryptography that is compliant
with the standards of conventional cryptography. This idea was captured
with different degrees of generality in [16, 102] (definition of permutations
via periodic approximations of automorphisms) and also in [15] (definition of
chaotic cryptographic primitives). The minimal framework we need for this
formulation is that of measure theory.
We say that (X,A, µ) is a measure space if X is a non-empty set, A is a
sigma-algebra of subsets of X and µ is a measure on (X,A). If µ(X) < ∞,
(X,A, µ) is called a finite-measure space. Typically, X will be a compact
topological or even metric space (think of a finite interval of Rn or of an n-
torus). We say that P = {A1, ..., AN} ⊂ A is a partition of X if ∪Nn=1An = X
and Ai∩Aj = ∅ for all i 6= j. A norm of P is a measure of its ‘coarseness’ (e.g.,
maximal length, maximal diameter, etc. of the elements of P). In order to
streamline the notation, we will usually refer only to X, with the underlying
3 The cipher proposed in [43] based on the discretized generalized baker map, was crypt-
analyzed in [98].
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A and µ being understood. Furthermore, chaos refers to dynamical systems
and these call for measure-invariant self-maps on finite-measure spaces, i.e.,
maps f : X → X such that f−1A ∈ A and µ(f−1A) = µ(A) for all A ∈ A.
A generalization of the discretized generalized baker map is the following
[36]. Suppose f is an automorphism of the finite-measure space (X,A, µ),
i.e., f is a one-to-one map of X onto itself such that both f and f−1 are
µ-invariant. We consider sequences of finite partitions {Pn} of the space X,
Pn = {P (n)k : 1 ≤ k ≤ qn}, such that limn→∞ Pn = E (the partition of
X into separate points) and sequences of automorphisms {fn} such that fn
preserves Pn (i.e., fn sends every element of Pn into an element of the same
partition). We say that an automorphism f of the space (X,A, µ) possesses
an approximation by periodic transformations with speed ϑ(n), if there exists
a sequence of automorphisms fn preserving Pn such that
qn∑
k=1
µ
(
f(P
(n)
k )4fn(P (n)k )
)
< ϑ(qn), n = 1, 2, . . . .
where 4 stands for symmetric set difference and ϑ is a function on the inte-
gers such that ϑ(n) → 0 monotonically. The sequence (Pn, fn) is a discrete
approximation of (X, f).
A further generalization brings us to the concept of discrete approximation.
This time we leave deliberately open the way the ‘discrete approximation’
converges to the continuous map.
Definition 1. [15] Let X be a finite-measure space and f : X → X a map.
Let X∆ = {A1, ..., AN(∆)} be a family of partitions of X, labelled by a param-
eter ∆, say, the partition norm, such that lim∆→0X∆ = E , the partition of
X into separate points. Furthermore, given a family of maps f∆ : X∆ → X,
define the extensions f¯∆ : X → X as f¯∆(x) = f∆(An) if x ∈ An ∈ X∆.
We say that (X∆, f∆) is a discrete approximation of (X, f) if, moreover,
lim∆→0 f¯∆ = f in some relevant sense (depending on the structure we put
on X).
This definition of discrete approximation is an idealization of what actually
happens when computing real functions with computers. Intuitively, discrete
approximation of chaotic maps are expected to generate permutations with
‘nice’ mixing properties and, therefore, appropriate for cryptographic appli-
cations.
Definition 2. [15] Discrete approximations of chaotic systems (X, f) in form
of permutations (ZM , FM ) are called chaotic cryptographic primitives. Fur-
thermore, we say that a cryptographic algorithm is chaotic if some of its
building blocks is a chaotic cryptographic primitive.
Thus, a stream cipher whose keystream is generated by a chaotic primitive
is a chaos-based cryptosystem. Let us present a few examples of chaotic
primitives (see also [15, 17]).
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Example 1. The Renyi map, φβ : [0, 1)→ [0, 1), is defined as
φβ(x) = βx mod 1,
where 1 < β ∈ R. A discretized (or digitalized) Renyi map f can be defined
on the set {0, 1, ..., 2n − 1} by
f(k) = bβ · kcmod 2n.
The derivation proceeds via the approximation of real numbers in [0, 1) by
dyadic rationals. The discretized Renyi map was used in [1] to generate ran-
dom numbers.
Example 2. The Chebyshev polynomial maps Tn : R → R of degree
n = 0, 1, ... are defined by the recursion
Tn(x) = 2xTn−1(x)− Tn−2(x) for n ≥ 2,
with T0(x) = 1, T1(x) = x. The interval [−1, 1] is invariant under the action
of the map Tn: Tn([−1, 1]) = [−1, 1]. Alternatively, one can define
Tn(x) = cos(n arccosx), −1 ≤ x ≤ 1.
The Chebyshev polynomial Tn restricted to [−1, 1] is a well-known chaotic
map for all n ≥ 2: it has a unique absolutely continuous invariant measure,
µ(x) =
1
pi
√
1− x2 ,
and LE lnn > 0 with respect to µ. For n = 2, the Chebyshev map reduces
to the logistic map.
It is straightforward to prove that Chebyshev polynomials have the semi-
group property:
Tr(Ts(x)) = Ts(Tr(x)) = Trs(x).
Let p be a prime number so as Zp is a field. The Chebyshev map over the
finite field Zp, Fn,p : {0, 1, . . . , p− 1} → {0, 1, . . . , p− 1}, is defined as
Fn,p(ξ) = Tn(ξ) (modp).
The semi-group property of the ‘discrete’ (or finite state) Chebyshev maps
Fn,p can be used in key-exchange protocols or even in public-key algorithms
[79, 58, 57]. However, this kind of maps (as any other) does not guarantee se-
curity itself, and a convenient key-exchange protocol along with an adequate
encryption procedure should be provided to achieve not only security, but
also computational efficiency (see the cryptanalysis of [110] in [2]).
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Other examples of chaotic primitives used in ciphers published in the lit-
erature, include the discrete logistic map and toral automorphisms (see, e.g.,
[58, 77]).
As a last example, let us discuss a synchronization-based cipher.
Example 3. Message-embedding is an encryption algorithm in which the
message mt is directly injected (or “embedded”) in a chaotic dynamic fθ :
J → J , where J ⊂ Rq and θ = (θ1, ..., θD) is an, in general, multi-component
parameter which acts as the secret key or is part of the secret key of the cipher.
In the simplest versions, encryption takes place at the sender according to
one of the following schemes:
(I)
{
xt+1 = fθ(xt,mt)
yt = hθ(xt,mt)
and (II)
{
xt+1 = fθ(xt,mt)
yt = h
′
θ(xt)
, (8.29)
the difference being the so-called relative degree r [81]; r = 0 in case (I) and
r > 0 in case (II). hθ is called the output function of the sender, since yt is
the message conveyed from the sender to the receiver through the communi-
caction channel. In general, hθ : J → Rq′ with q′ ≤ q (ideally q′ = 1). The
receiver is a kind of ‘mirrored’ dynamical system, generated by a family of
maps f˜θ and endowed with output functions h˜θ. The retrieval of the mes-
sage (plaintext) at the receiver is achieved in two steps: (i) synchronization
[45, 108], based on a suitable choice of f˜θ, and (ii) estimation of mt by means
of a suitable function which depends on the internal state xˆt of the receiver
and the output yt, the only information transmitted from the sender to the
receiver.
Two mechanisms have been proposed in the literature to recover mt: (i) the
inverse system approach [41] and, in case of noisy channels, (ii) the unknown
input observer approach (UIO) [52, 82]. In both cases, the equations governing
the receiver are: {
xˆt+r+1 = f˜θ(xt+r, yt, ..., yt+r)
mˆt+r = gθ(xˆt+r, yt, ..., yt+r)
,
with r ≥ 0 and g such that
mˆt+r = gθ(xˆt+r, yt, ..., yt+r) = mt when xˆt+r = xt.
The existence of an inverse system or an UIO is guaranteed under the as-
sumption that the system (8.29-I) or (8.29-II) is left invertible. In our setting,
left invertibility means that there exists an integer R ≥ 0 such that the input
mt is uniquely determined by the knowledge of the state xt along with the
output sequence yt, ..., yt+R.
Message-embedding is very attractive because synchronization is assured
without any restriction on the variation rate of mt. For cryptographic applica-
tions it is sometimes convenient to decompose the dynamic fθ in two actions
in order to eventually incorporate boolean and arithmetic operations. Such
is the case of the hybrid message-embedding technique, where the chaotic
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dynamic is decomposed as follows:
(I’)
ut = νe(xt,mt)xt+1 = qθ(xt, ut)
yt = rθ(xt, ut)
and (II’)
ut = νe(xt,mt)xt+1 = qθ(xt, ut)
yt = r
′
θ(xt)
, (8.30)
for sender systems with relative degree r = 0 (I’) and r > 0 (II’). ut is
sometimes called the pre-ciphertext in hybrid message-embedding.
Message-embedding and hybrid message-embedding can be used with let-
ters taken from finite fields (and boolean operations in the hybrid scheme)
[81]. Under the further assumption of flatness [81], they have been proved
to be structurally equivalent to a self-synchronizing stream cipher —a well-
tested architecture in conventional cryptography. We conclude that the secu-
rity of these chaos-based ciphers relies on the security of the corresponding
chaotic primitives (fθ in (8.29), and qθ and/or νe in (8.30)).
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